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Abstract5
We present a model combining the two regulatory stages relevant to the approval of a6
new health technology: the authorisation of its commercialisation and the insurer’s decision7
about whether to reimburse its cost. We show that the degree of uncertainty concerning the8
true value of the insurer’s maximum willingness to pay for a unit increase in effectiveness9
has a non-monotonic impact on the optimal price of the innovation, the firm’s expected profit10
and the optimal sample size of the clinical trial. A key result is that there exists a range of11
values of the uncertainty parameter over which a reduction in uncertainty benefits the firm,12
the insurer and patients. We consider how different policy parameters may be used as in-13
centive mechanisms, and the incentives to invest in R&D for marginal projects such as those14
targeting rare diseases. The model is calibrated using data on a new treatment for cystic15
fibrosis.16
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1 Introduction21
The fast pace of growth of health care expenditure relative to GDP growth that has been ex-22
perienced by most developed countries, especially prior to the global economic crisis (OECD,23
2013), has led regulators to look for innovative solutions to deal with the increasing demands24
on health care budgets. With a general consensus that technological innovation plays a central25
role in driving increased costs (Weisbrod, 1991), much effort has been targeted towards the pro-26
cess by which new health technologies are adopted and priced. The aim has been to reduce two27
types of risk faced by regulators: paying for technologies that are not ‘good value for money’28
and adopting technologies whose effectiveness, once deployed, is lower than the efficacy that29
was demonstrated in the clinical trials upon whose results the adoption decisions were made30
(Eichler et al., 2011).31
Including an assessment of a new health technology’s cost-effectiveness has been a com-32
mon response to the first risk. However, the precise role played by cost-effectiveness results in33
determining adoption decisions is less than transparent. Even the National Institute for Health34
and Care Excellence (NICE) in the UK, probably one of the most open institutions in this re-35
spect, does not refer to a single value for the cost-effectiveness threshold, but to a range of36
between £20,000 and £30,000 per Quality Adjusted Life Year gained (NICE, 2008). Running37
a high quality, large, Phase III trial is instrumental in mitigating the second risk. However, in38
recent years, there has been a growing interest in risk-sharing agreements (Pita Barros, 2011;39
Towse and Garrison, 2010; Cook et al., 2008).40
Somewhat surprisingly, as health care insurers have grown more concerned about technology-41
induced expenditure growth, suppliers of innovations have witnessed a substantial reduction in42
the number of new drugs approved per billion of US dollars spent on R&D (Scannell et al.,43
2012; Pammolli et al., 2011) and an increase in the average cost of development of a new drug44
(DiMasi et al., 2003, 2016). This has inspired investigation into the impact of specific regu-45
latory decisions on the incentives to invest in R&D by the industry, including price regula-46
tion (Filson, 2012), cost-effectiveness thresholds (Jena and Philipson, 2008), value-based pricing47
(Danzon et al., 2015) and risk-sharing agreements (Levaggi et al., 2015). Empirical evidence48
suggests that tighter regulation presents weaker incentives for the industry to invest in R&D, and49
delays in the adoption of innovations (Danzon and Epstein, 2008; Golec et al., 2010; Vernon,50
2005; Danzon et al., 2005; Kyle, 2007).51
The tension between the objective of curbing expenditure on health technologies that are al-52
ready available in the market and the need to incentivise investment in R&D that will lead to53
future innovations is known as the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. However,54
equity concerns may also be relevant. For a regulatory framework which does not explicitly55
account for the size of the population to be treated, incentives to invest in R&D are weaker for56
technologies targeting comparatively rare diseases (‘orphan diseases’). One reason why these57
are comparatively unattractive areas for R&D investment is that predicted sales revenue is pro-58
portional to the size of the population to treat, while R&D expenses are largely independent of59
it (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Dimitri, 2012). Moreover, for rare diseases, meeting the require-60
ments set by authorities regulating market access may be more costly, and require a longer period61
for experimentation, due to the availability of a smaller population from which to obtain a sam-62
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ple. Hence, disincentives for research into rare diseases may be found at both commercialisation,63
and development, stages.64
A new drug needs to pass two key regulatory stages if it is to be approved for use by a health65
care insurer. Firstly, it must be deemed to be safe and efficacious. If these conditions are met, the66
drug can be used, but it must be fully paid for by the patient. If, as is often the case, the majority67
of the cost is paid by an (often public) health insurer, that insurer must then decide whether the68
drug can be reimbursed at a particular price. This price is determined according to rules which69
vary considerably from country to country. The importance of the cost-effectiveness dimension70
has been growing in recent years. As a result, Phase III clinical trials, which previously aimed71
only to assess effectiveness, are often accompanied by an economic evaluation.72
This paper presents a unified, Bayesian decision-theoretic framework to investigate late-stage73
R&D incentives for the pharmaceutical industry in the presence of these two, exogenous, reg-74
ulatory stages. We model a health technology provider operating within a defined jurisdiction75
(such as at the country level) and define its optimal sampling and pricing policies in a two stage76
problem. In the first stage, the provider decides whether to run a Phase III trial and, if it does so,77
the trial’s sample size. In making its decision, the provider knows that, should the regulatory au-78
thority which reviews the trial evidence deem the treatment to be effective at a predefined level of79
statistical significance, the provider may apply for reimbursement by a health care insurer in the80
second stage. This involves proposing a price for the new product which, when combined with81
the evidence on effectiveness provided by the trial, determines the incremental cost-effectiveness82
ratio upon which the health care insurer bases its reimbursement decision.83
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to present a full analysis of how the ‘dou-84
ble hurdle’, in the form of the regulatory authority and the health care insurer, affects optimal85
price, expected profit, the ‘go/no go’ decision for a Phase III clinical trial, and the trial’s sample86
size. A key result is that the degree of uncertainty surrounding the true value of the insurer’s87
maximum willingness to pay for a unit increase in effectiveness has a non-monotonic impact on88
the optimal price of the innovation, the firm’s optimal expected profit and the optimal sample89
size chosen for the Phase III clinical trial. We identify three ranges for the uncertainty parameter,90
in which increases in uncertainty have different effects. In the ‘low uncertainty’ range, increases91
in uncertainty result in lower prices, lower expected profits and a smaller trial sample size. In92
the ‘high uncertainty’ range, the situation is reversed: greater uncertainty leads to higher prices,93
higher expected profits and a larger trial sample size. Intuitively, when there exists low uncer-94
tainty, the mass of the probability distribution for willingness to pay is concentrated around its95
expected value. Price and profits fall following a small increase in uncertainty because a price96
reduction maintains the probability of adoption at a comparatively high level, while causing a97
relatively small reduction in the value of revenues conditional upon adoption. In contrast, when98
there exists high uncertainty, price and profits rise following an increase in uncertainty because99
a price rise has little impact on the probability of adoption but increases the reward in the event100
that adoption takes place.101
For ‘intermediate uncertainty’, prices are increasing, expected profits decreasing and sample102
size decreasing in the degree of uncertainty. This implies that there exists a range of values103
of the uncertainty parameter – the ‘intermediate uncertainty’ range – over which a reduction104
in uncertainty benefits the firm, the insurer and patients. Subsequent analysis considers how the105
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regulatory framework may influence a health technology provider’s incentive to invest in projects106
which are deemed by the provider to be ‘marginal’, that is, ones for which the expected profit is107
close to zero, by looking at the incentive to research treatments for rare diseases. In particular, we108
characterise the minimum size of a population to treat such that the firm is incentivised to invest109
in the development of a new drug. In an application using published data from trials of a new110
treatment for cystic fibrosis, defined as a rare disease by the Orphanet register of rare diseases111
(Orphanet, 2014), we show how parameters and regulatory policies in both periods, such as the112
level of the Type I error that characterises the regulatory authority’s decision and the uncertainty113
surrounding the level of the payer’s maximum willingness to pay for one effectiveness unit, can114
affect the incentives to invest.115
Section 2 presents a brief summary of the literature. Section 3 presents the model. Sections116
3.1 to 3.3 provide a non-technical introduction to the model, and additional technical elements117
that are required to obtain the main propositions are introduced in Section 3.4. Theoretical results118
for optimal policies at the regulatory and pricing stages are presented in Section 4. Those wishing119
to skip the technical material and the formal solution of the optimisation problem may omit120
Sections 3.4 and 4 and move directly to the application, which is presented in a self-contained121
manner in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the main results, avenues for future research, and122
concludes.123
2 Background124
The work builds on a number of statistical and economic approaches to Phase III trial design,125
drug approval decisions and research on rare diseases. Kikuchi and Gittins (2009) and Kikuchi et126
al. (2008) propose a ‘Behavioural Bayes’ model of sample size determination in a Phase III trial127
which accounts for the costs and benefits of the trial as well as the deployment of the new treat-128
ment. The model is ‘behavioural’ because, following the ideas of Gittins and Pezeshk (2000),129
although it maximises total expected net benefit from the perspective of the firm developing the130
drug, the behaviours of the regulator and users of the drug are not assumed to be optimal. The131
authors model the level of demand for the new treatment as an increasing function of the point132
estimate of effectiveness from the trial. Willan (2008) and Willan and Eckermann (2010) present133
Bayesian models of drug development in which the optimal sample size is chosen to maximise134
the expected value of sample information, minus the costs of the trial.135
Acemoglu and Linn (2004) consider the effect of the potential size of markets on pharma-136
ceutical innovation and entry of new drugs. The authors derive an equilibrium condition for the137
levels of R&D effort and show that, the greater is the market size, the more profitable it is to sup-138
ply the drug and so the greater will be the research effort required to gain market-leader position.139
Magazzini et al. (2013) consider the effects of R&D sunk cost and market size on a pharmaceu-140
tical company’s decision to enter a clinical trial. They present a two-stage model with a number141
of firms which can enter one or more therapeutic submarkets and compete for customers. In142
line with Acemoglu and Linn, the authors predict that, the greater is the market size, the higher143
is the total R&D investment. With lower success rates and a higher cost per trial, fewer firms144
enter clinical testing. Further, an increase in sunk R&D expenditures lowers the number of trials145
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and firms. Pennings and Sereno (2011) present a real options model evaluating pharmaceutical146
R&D under what they term ‘technical’ and ‘economic’ uncertainty. They recognise the risk of147
failure (for example, due to safety issues) during drug development, but do not model clinical148
trial design or pricing. Dranove and Meltzer (1994) are concerned with the time for new medical149
entities to be approved in the US and conclude that, since the 1950s, more important drugs reach150
the market sooner than less important ones.151
These models are important precursors to ours, but none of them explicitly combines the152
optimal choice of a trial’s sample size with a price-setting rule, in the presence of uncertainty153
surrounding the health care insurer’s maximum willingness to pay for a unit increase in effec-154
tiveness.155
3 The model156
We take the perspective of a Health Technology Provider (HTP) considering whether to com-157
mission a Phase III clinical trial to evaluate the efficacy of a new drug. Let µ be the expected158
value of the incremental effectiveness of the new treatment versus standard in the population159
(assumed unknown to all agents). For simplicity we assume that the trial is placebo-controlled,160
an assumption which may be justified when there exists no approved treatment, or when the new161
treatment is given as an add-on to existing standard treatment. The HTP has a prior distribution162
on µ, defined by a normal random variable with mean µ0 and variance σ20 .163
It is assumed that the n responses observed in the trial are used to calculate the sample mean164
X , an unbiased and consistent estimator of µ:165
X | µ ∼ N
(
µ,
σ2
n
)
, (1)
where σ is assumed known to all agents. We use the convention that upper case denotes a random166
variable (e.g., at the start of the planning horizon, X is a random variable) and lower case denotes167
its realisation (e.g., once the trial has concluded, x denotes the realisation of X).168
The HTP knows that, if a clinical trial is commissioned, upon its completion, a Regulatory169
Authority (RA) in charge of granting access to a market with N patients considers the trial’s ev-170
idence concerning the drug’s incremental effectiveness, together with its standard error. There is171
no threat of entry which challenges the market size N , and so it is assumed that N is known with172
certainty by the HTP. We call this stage – establishment of prior, trial commissioning, conduct,173
reporting and RA assessment – ‘Stage 0’.174
If RA approval is granted, the HTP tries to have the new drug reimbursed by a Health Care175
Insurer (HCI) by proposing a price, p > 0, for the treatment of a single patient in the market.176
This stage is called ‘Stage 1’. In proposing the price, the HTP does not know the value of the177
HCI’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for an additional unit of effectiveness, i.e. the cost-178
effectiveness threshold. Rather, the uncertainty concerning the HCI’s maximum WTP, from the179
perspective of the HTP, is modelled as a random variable so that, in seeking a higher price for the180
drug, the HTP faces a trade-off: a higher proposed price offers the potential for higher profits,181
but it reduces the probability that the drug is reimbursed by the HCI.182
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The HTP’s choice variables may be summarised as follows: 1. the Stage 0 decision concern-183
ing whether or not to commission a trial and, if a trial is commissioned, what its sample size, n,184
should be; 2. in the event that RA approval is granted, the Stage 1 decision of proposing a price185
to the HCI. The HTP’s ‘planning horizon’, over which optimisation takes place, comprises both186
Stages 0 and 1.187
The optimal Stage 1 pricing policy depends on the estimate of incremental effectiveness that188
results from the clinical trial, which is a random variable from the perspective of Stage 0. Hence189
the problem must be solved recursively. The Stage 1 problem is solved first to yield an optimal190
pricing policy conditional upon x. Then the Stage 0 problem is solved, using the HTP’s beliefs191
about the realisation of X that will result from the clinical trial, to determine whether or not192
to commission the trial, as well as its optimal sample size, accounting for the optimal Stage 1193
pricing policy.194
3.1 The Regulatory Authority195
Conditional upon meeting a requirement for a minimum sample size, nmin, for the trial, the RA’s196
decision is based upon classical frequentist statistical criteria, so that the new treatment is re-197
quired to show superiority to placebo at a given one-sided level of statistical significance, α,198
where α is conventionally taken to be 2.5% (Food and Drug Administration, 1998). Hence ap-199
proval for the new treatment will be granted if and only if n ≥ nmin and the observed value of200
incremental effectiveness, x, exceeds a critical value, xcrit(n) > 0, defined as:201
xcrit(n) ≡ zασ√
n
, (2)
where zα is the standard normal Z-value corresponding to the one-sided significance level, α.202
If this condition is not satisfied, the treatment is rejected by the RA and is not taken forward to203
Stage 1. If the condition is satisfied, the HTP proceeds to Stage 1 and proposes a price to the204
HCI.205
3.2 The Health Care Insurer206
The HCI aims to ensure that only innovations that are deemed to be ‘good value for money’ are207
reimbursed. It compares x with the price, p, proposed by the HTP, using the incremental cost208
effectiveness ratio (ICER). We ignore differences in costs which are not directly related to the209
cost of the drug, implying that the ICER considered by the HCI is p / x. The drug is approved if210
this proposed ICER is less than, or equal to, the HCI’s maximum WTP for an additional unit of211
effectiveness.212
From the perspective of the HTP, the value of the HCI’s maximum WTP is uncertain and213
is modelled using a continuous random variable, W , with cumulative distribution function FW .214
We assume that FW belongs to a location-scale family of random variables, meaning that we can215
characterise any member in terms of the pair (m, s), where m is the expected value (location) of216
W and the scale, s, can be considered a measure of its uncertainty, or spread. This assumption217
is commonly applied in economic models of decision making under risk (Meyer, 1987) and218
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covers a wide class of distributions, including the uniform, normal and logistic. It is sufficiently219
general to contain members that can be used to approximate uncertainty concerning WTP; it is220
sufficiently simple to allow for a convenient and easily understandable parameterisation.221
3.3 The Health Technology Provider’s problem222
At the beginning of Stage 0, the HTP must decide whether or not it should enter Phase III clinical223
testing and, if it does, the optimal sample size for the trial. The cost of performing the trial is224
assumed to be I0 + dn, where I0 > 0 is the fixed cost of setting up the trial and d > 0 is the cost225
of increasing the sample size by one unit.226
Once the trial has taken place and x is known, if RA approval is granted, the HTP’s Stage 1227
problem is to propose a price, p, to the HCI. For the purposes of subsequent analysis we note that,228
since x is known in Stage 1, an increase (decrease) in p always implies an increase (decrease) in229
the ICER. We assume that the fixed cost of commercialising the drug, together with the marginal230
production cost, equal zero. This is plausible if production costs are negligible relative to R&D231
costs, which is true for most pharmaceuticals (Newhouse, 2004; Barton and Emanuel, 2005). In232
Section 5 we relax this assumption using a calibrated application.233
The HCI will adopt the new drug with probability 1−FW ( p / x ;m, s ), which may be inter-234
preted as the individual expected demand function, DW ( · ) = 1− FW ( p / x ;m, s ). If the drug235
is not approved for reimbursement, the HTP makes zero profits. Define θ ≡ (N, x, m, s ). If236
the HCI approves the drug for reimbursement, profits are N p, implying that the Stage 1 expected237
profit function is:238
Γ1( p; θ ) = N p [ 1− FW ( p / x ;m, s ) ] . (3)
As already noted, the HTP’s problem is solved recursively. Firstly, it establishes an optimal239
Stage 1 pricing policy as a function of x, taking into account uncertainty concerning maximum240
WTP. It then uses this policy and its prior on µ to solve the Stage 0 problem, make the ‘go/no go’241
decision for the clinical trial, and decide the trial’s optimal sample size. At Stage 0, uncertainty242
on µ is encoded using a normal prior density with mean µ0 and standard deviation σ0, so that the243
prior predictive distribution for X that is used to compute the expected profit over the two stages244
is normal with mean µ0 and standard deviation
√
σ20 + σ
2/n (Pratt et al., 1995).245
In order to derive the main theoretical results of Section 4, it is necessary to state a number246
of assumptions concerning the probability distribution FW . These are dealt with in Section 3.4.247
The reader wishing to skip these more technical aspects and the formal solution to the model248
may move directly to the application in Section 5.249
3.4 Characterisation of the distribution for WTP250
Following the ideas in Meyer (1987), Van den Berg (2007) and Johnson and Myatt (2006), we251
introduce the following assumptions on the probability distribution for W .252
A1 (Location-scale family)253
Let T be a random variable with zero mean and finite variance. Assume that the cumulative254
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wFW
m0
Figure 1: An increase in the uncertainty concerning maximum WTP, s, rotates its cumulative
distribution function, FW , around its location parameter, m.
distribution function of T , FT , is twice continuously differentiable with probability density255
function fT . The cumulative distribution function of the HCI’s maximum willingness to256
pay, FW , is assumed to belong to a location-scale family of random variables defined by257
FW (w) = FT ( (w −m) / s), where m is the location parameter and s the scale parameter.258
A2 (Increasing hazard function).259
The hazard function of T , rT (t) = fT (t)/(1− FT (t)), is an increasing function for t ∈ R.260
Assumption A1 permits us uniquely to define any member of the family describing maximum261
WTP in terms of the pair (m, s), separating the location and scale properties from the shape of the262
distribution, which is determined by FT . It is required to define the existence of an optimal price,263
as well as to obtain comparative statics results. As shown in Figure 1, the assumption implies that264
an increase in s rotates FW around the location parameter m such that FW increases/decreases265
according to whether w is less than/greater than m. That is:266
w R m ⇐⇒ ∂FW
∂s
⋚ 0. (4)
Intuitively, an increase in s implies that the density is moved from the centre of the distribution267
to the tails, while ensuring that the distribution functions cross only once, at m. The economic268
interpretation is that, following an increase in s, the expected demand function, DW ( · ) = 1 −269
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FW ( v ;m, s ), decreases for values of the ICER that are below m and increases for values that270
are above m.271
Assumption A2 is required to show that the optimal price is unique for every combination272
of the location and scale parameters and may therefore be considered to be a function of m273
and s. It may best be interpreted by referring to the concept of increasing duration dependence274
borrowed from the survival analysis literature. Let us define the ICER as v = p / x, so that275
DW = 1 − FW (v;m, s ) is the probability that the HCI accepts a proposed ICER equal to v. If276
the HTP increases the ICER by a small amount, ∆, the probability of acceptance, DW , decreases277
by approximatelyD′W (v)∆. Given acceptance of the technology at v, the conditional probability278
that the technology is rejected due to this price increase is therefore ∆(−D′W (v)/DW (v)) and is279
increasing in v. Thus, rW (v) = −D′W (v)/DW (v) can also be interpreted as the marginal risk of280
rejection.281
4 Optimal Stage 0 and 1 policies282
The Stage 1 problem may be thought of as a monopolist’s pricing problem, in which marginal283
cost is equal to zero and there exists a true, fixed, maximum willingness to pay for the new drug.284
This WTP is unknown to the HTP, who therefore places a probability distribution upon it. The285
problem is also similar in nature to models such as those of independent private value auctions286
(Van den Berg, 2007). In this section, we outline the optimal solution for each stage: first, we287
derive the HTP’s optimal Stage 1 pricing policy as a function of the estimate of effectiveness288
from the trial. Then we solve for the optimal Stage 0 sample size.289
4.1 Optimal Stage 1 policy290
At the start of Stage 1, x is known, whereas p is to be chosen optimally by the HTP. The Stage291
1 maximisation problem may be considered from the perspective of the optimal choice of the292
ICER, v, by writing Eq. (3) as follows:293
Γ∗1( θ ) ≡ max
v > 0
N xv [ 1 − FW ( v; m, s ) ] . (5)
The optimal ICER is the value v = v∗(m, s) which solves the first order necessary condition:294
1− FW ( v ;m, s )− vfW ( v ;m, s ) = 0, (6)
or, equivalently,295
v =
1
rW (v ;m, s )
, (7)
which is a simplified version of the standard monopolist’s inverse elasticity rule for a single296
product in the presence of zero marginal production cost (Tirole, 1988). By Assumption A1, an297
optimal solution to the maximisation problem in Eq. (5) exists and satisfies Eq. (6) because the298
profit function Γ1( v; θ ) is a differentiable function of the ICER, v, on the interval (0,∞) and299
the term v[ 1 − FW (·) ] in Eq. (5) tends to zero as v tends to infinity, owing to the assumption300
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vΓ1, DW
1 Expected Profit (Γ1)
Demand (DW )
v∗
D∗W
Γ∗1
Figure 2: Expected profit function (Eq. (5), continuous line), expected demand function
DW ( · ) ≡ 1 − FW ( v ;m, s ) (short dash) and the LHS of Eq. (6) (long dash) showing the
optimal choice of the ICER, v∗.
that T has a finite mean (Van den Berg, 2007). Assumption A2 implies that 1 / rW ( v ;m, s ) is301
decreasing in v, so that the solution v∗(m, s) of Eq. (7) must be unique.302
Figure 2 plots the expected profit function, Γ1, the expected demand function (short dash),303
and the LHS of Eq. (6) (long dash) and shows the determination of the optimal ICER, v∗. Note304
that, according to Assumption A1, an increase in s rotates FW clockwise (Figure 1) and the305
expected demand function counter-clockwise (Figure 2), both around m. The change in the306
slope of the expected demand function following an increase in s affects v∗ through Eq. (6).307
As is clear from comparison of Eqs. (5) and (6), N and x affect the level of optimal profits,308
but not the optimal choice of the ICER. This provides two simple, but important, expressions for309
optimal price and profits in terms of the optimal ICER, v∗, which are required to solve the Stage310
0 problem. They show that the optimal price is independent of the population size, while being311
strictly increasing in the effect size, x:312
p∗( x, m, s ) = x v∗(m, s ), (8a)
Γ∗1( θ ) = xN ρ
∗(m, s ), (8b)
where ρ∗(m, s) ≡ v∗(m, s ) [ 1− FW (v∗(m, s );m, s ) ]
The following comparative statics expressions for optimal price (ICER) and profit with respect313
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to N , x and m are formally derived in Appendix A.1:314
(i) ∂Γ
∗
1
∂N
> 0; (ii) ∂Γ
∗
1
∂x
> 0; (iii) ∂Γ
∗
1
∂m
> 0; (9a)
(iv) ∂p
∗
∂N
= 0; (v) ∂p
∗
∂x
= v∗(m, s) > 0; (vi) ∂p
∗
∂m
≥ 0. (9b)
The results for N and x have been discussed above. For m, the best way to interpret the result is315
to refer to Figure 2: an increase in m shifts DW to the right, raising the probability of acceptance316
at v∗. The HTP may therefore obtain higher expected profits than before, at a higher price,317
because a marginal increase in v raises expected revenue while the demand, or probability of318
acceptance, remains above D∗W .319
We next consider results for the response of optimal profit and price to changes in the scale320
parameter, s, highlighting their importance for this work by stating them as propositions. Both321
Assumptions A1 and A2 are needed in the proofs.322
Proposition 1 (Effect of uncertainty surrounding the HCI’s maximum willingness to pay323
on Stage 1 optimal expected profit). Optimal Stage 1 profit is a U-shaped function of the un-324
certainty surrounding the HCI’s maximum willingness to pay for one unit of effectiveness, s.325
The function has a global minimum at sˆ = mrT (0). Moreover, the optimal ICER proposed by326
the HTP will be lower/higher than m according to whether s is lower/higher than sˆ, that is,327
m ⋚ v∗(m, s ) ⇐⇒ sˆ ⋚ s.328
Proof: See Appendix A.1.329
330
Note that, in Proposition 1, a result for the value of v∗ relative to m is stated in terms of the331
value of s relative to sˆ. Proposition 2 extends this partial result to a full characterisation of the332
response of the optimal price (and hence the optimal ICER), p∗, to changes in s. Proposition333
2 states a sufficient condition which, by ensuring that ∂v∗/∂s is a strictly increasing function334
of s and that lims→0 v∗(m, s) = m may be proved, implies a U-shape also for v∗ as a function335
of s. The proposition requires that an assumption be placed on the Mill’s ratio, defined as the336
reciprocal of the hazard function (M(t) = 1/rT (t)), which holds for common distributions such337
as the normal and the logistic.338
Proposition 2 (Effect of uncertainty surrounding the HCI’s maximum willingness to pay339
on Stage 1 optimal expected price). If the Mill’s ratio, M , satisfies M ′′ > 0, then the optimal340
price is a U-shaped function of the uncertainty surrounding the HCI’s maximum WTP for one341
unit of effectiveness, s, with a global minimum at some s˜ < sˆ.342
Proof: See Appendix A.1.343
344
The economic intuition for these results is as follows. When the uncertainty surrounding345
the true value of the HCI’s maximum WTP is relatively small (‘low uncertainty’), the mass of346
the distribution of W is concentrated around its expected value. Hence, if s increases, a small347
reduction in the proposed price keeps the probability of adoption by the HCI comparatively high,348
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while causing just a small reduction in the value of revenues conditional upon adoption. Hence349
p∗ decreases with s. On the other hand, if s is very large (‘high uncertainty’), a small reduction350
in p affects the probability of adoption only marginally. Hence, if s increases, it is optimal to351
increase p∗, to maximise the reward in the event of adoption taking place.352
Concerning the relative size of the intervals defining low, intermediate and high uncertainty,353
Proposition 1 defines the value of sˆ as a function ofm and the hazard function for the standardised354
distribution chosen to model maximum WTP (sˆ = mrT (0)). As is shown in Appendix A.1, the355
position of s˜ relative to sˆ may also be defined by making reference to this hazard function, using356
results from Proposition 2. A numerical computation shows that sˆ/s˜ = 2.935 for the standard357
logistic distribution that is chosen for the application of Section 5.358
Propositions 1 and 2 have important policy implications, because they imply that, for s suf-359
ficiently large (s > sˆ), reductions in uncertainty surrounding the HCI’s maximum WTP for one360
unit of effectiveness (e.g. by the HCI being more explicit about the decision process that leads to361
adoption/rejection decisions) induce the HTP to propose lower prices and accept lower expected362
profits. When there is low uncertainty (s < s˜), the same policy would lead to the opposite re-363
sult, that is, higher prices and higher expected profits. Interestingly, for intermediate values of364
uncertainty (s˜ < s < sˆ), both parties would benefit from greater transparency, because optimal365
prices would be reduced and optimal expected profits increased. The reason is that, with less366
uncertainty, it is optimal for HTPs to propose lower prices, but the increase in the probability of367
acceptance that this would imply is such that expected profits would be higher. Figure 4(a) of the368
application shows the three regions of s for which these various effects may be observed.369
As the uncertainty surrounding the value of the HCI’s maximum willingness to pay decreases370
towards 0 the expected demand function DW converges towards a step function that equals one371
when v < m and zero when v > m. In this formal limit case, it is clear that the optimal behaviour372
of the HTP is to choose a price just at the limit of what the HCI will accept, so that v∗ = m. This373
suggests that lims→0 v∗(m, s) = m and, further, that, as s → 0, any change in m is matched by374
an equal change in v∗.375
4.2 Optimal Stage 0 policy376
At the start of Stage 0, the HTP is in possession of the following information which allows it to377
make an optimal ‘go/no go’ decision for the Phase III clinical trial, and to choose the optimal378
sample size of the trial if the decision is ‘go’: 1. it has a prior distribution on expected incremental379
effectiveness, as described at the start of Section 3; 2. it therefore knows, for any sample size n,380
the prior predictive distribution for the point estimate of incremental effectiveness, X , that will381
result from the Phase III trial (see Section 3.3); 3. it has solved the Stage 1 problem, which has382
established the optimal pricing policy and expected reward as a function of the point estimate, x,383
that results from the trial (Eqs. (8a) and (8b)).384
In this section, we explain how the prior predictive distribution for x and the optimal Stage 1385
policy may be used to establish the expected reward at Stage 0 for any choice of sample size n386
and hence the optimal Stage 0 ‘go/no go’ and sample size decisions.387
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4.2.1 Optimal sample size determination388
From the perspective of the start of Stage 0, define Γ0(n; ·) as the expected reward of running a389
Phase III trial with a sample size n and pricing optimally during Stage 1 according to the policy390
of Eq. (8a) to give the reward in Eq. (8b). In Stage 0, the estimate of incremental effectiveness391
that will result from the trial is a random variable, X . Hence so are the optimal prices and392
rewards, since both are linear functions of the realisation of X (see Eqs. (8a) and (8b)).393
The Stage 0 optimal choice of n uses the prior predictive density for X to weight the Stage 1394
rewards and calculate the expected total reward for the project as a function of n. Because, from395
Eq. (8b), Γ∗1 is linear in x, optimal Stage 0 expected profits, Γ∗0, may be written as:1396
Γ∗0( · ) ≡ maxn
{
N ρ∗(m, s )E
[
X |X > xcrit(n)
]
P(X > xcrit(n) )− (I0 + dn)
}
, (10)
subject to n ≥ nmin.
P is the probability that the realisation of x from the trial exceeds the RA’s lower acceptance397
threshold, xcrit(n). Since the prior predictive distribution for X is normal with mean µ0 and398
standard deviation σp(n) =
√
σ20 + σ
2/n, it follows that399
P(X > xcrit(n) ) = 1 − Φ
(
xcrit(n)− µ0
σp(n)
)
, (11)
where Φ denotes the CDF of the standard normal distribution.400
Changing the sample size, n, has two effects on expected rewards: firstly, increasing n re-401
duces the standard deviation of the predictive distribution, σp; secondly, increasing n lowers the402
acceptance threshold, xcrit. As a result, changes in n change both the conditional expected value403
of X and the conditional probability, P , in Eq. (10).404
For an interior solution, n∗ > nmin and ∂Γ0(·)/∂n = 0, implying that the following condition405
holds:406
N ρ∗(m, s )E[X |X > xcrit(n) ]P(X > xcrit(n) )
n
(
eE[·],n + eP(·),n
)
= d. (12)
The left hand side of this expression is the marginal benefit (MB) of sampling at Stage 0, ac-407
counting for the optimal pricing policy and optimal expected reward at Stage 1. The right hand408
side is the marginal cost (MC). The marginal benefit expression is best interpreted by breaking409
it into two parts. The term that is not in parentheses measures the expected Stage 1 reward at410
the (Stage 0) study-subject level; the expected contribution made to profits of one study subject411
recruited to the trial. The term in parentheses is the elasticity of the Stage 1 expected reward with412
respect to n (by a standard result for the elasticity of a product, this is equal to the sum of the two413
1This is because expected revenue at Stage 0 is
∫∞
xcrit(n)
xfX N ρ
∗(m, s ) dx, where fX is the pdf of the prior
predictive distribution. Eq. (10) follows because N ρ∗(m, s ) is a constant and ∫∞
xcrit(n)
fX x dx = E
[
X |X >
xcrit(n)
]
P(X > xcrit(n) ).
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elasticities that appear in parentheses). These elasticities capture the two aforementioned effects414
of n on the conditional expectation and the probability of acceptance, respectively.415
The per-study-subject expected reward will be strictly positive because xcrit(nmin) can never416
be less than zero. Hence the sign of the marginal benefit function is determined by the signs and417
sizes of the two elasticities. Since both E[X |X > xcrit(n) ] > 0 and P(x > xcrit(n)) > 0, the418
sign of each elasticity depends solely on the sign of the partial derivative that each contains. In419
general, marginal benefit may be an increasing, or decreasing, function of n. There will exist a420
unique optimal value of n∗ > nmin if there is a single point where Eq. (12) is satisfied and the421
marginal benefit function is falling. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.422
Although a full characterisation of the Stage 0 optimality condition is hard to obtain because423
of the aforementioned effects of changes in n, it is possible to state the main Stage 0 result, which424
concerns the comparative statics results for Stage 0 expected profits and optimal sample size with425
respect to s for the case of a unique n∗ > nmin.426
Proposition 3 (Effect of uncertainty surrounding the HCI’s maximum willingness to pay on427
Stage 0 optimal expected profits and optimal sample size). (a) If FW satisfies the assumptions428
of Section 3 and optimal profit, Γ∗0, is as defined in Eq. (10), then an increase in uncertainty429
increases/decreases Stage 0 profits according to whether s is greater than or less than sˆ as430
defined in Proposition 1:431
∂Γ∗0
∂s
R 0 ⇐⇒ s R sˆ. (13)
(b) SupposeFW satisfies the assumptions of Section 3 and that there exists a unique n∗(N,m, s) >432
nmin which solves Eq. (10). Suppose further that the conditions required for applying the implicit433
function theorem in the computation of ∂n∗/∂s are fulfilled. Then the optimal sample size is434
increasing/decreasing in the level of uncertainty according to whether s is greater than or less435
than sˆ:436
∂n∗
∂s
R 0 ⇐⇒ s R sˆ. (14)
437
Proof: See Appendix A.2.438
439
Using the same methods of proof, it is possible to derive comparative static results for optimal440
profits with respect toN andm under the assumptions of Proposition 3(a) which lead to Eq. (13):441
(i) ∂Γ
∗
0
∂N
> 0; (ii) ∂Γ
∗
0
∂m
> 0. (15)
Further, under the assumptions of Proposition 3(a) and (b) which lead to Eq. (14), it is possible442
to derive the comparative static results for optimal sample size with respect to N and m:443
(i) ∂n
∗
∂N
> 0; (ii) ∂n
∗
∂m
> 0. (16)
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Figure 3: Determination of an interior solution for the optimal sample size at Stage 0 (Eq. (12)).
Two policy implications follow from these results. First, an increase in m, the expected value444
of maximum WTP, not only increases the expected profit of the project, but also the optimal445
sample size of the trial. Second, since the optimal sample size, n∗, is an increasing function of446
the population size, N , it will be optimal to select lower sample sizes for rare diseases and there447
will exist a lower bound on population size below which no trial will be optimal. This matter is448
considered next, in the context of the optimal investment decision.449
4.2.2 Optimal investment decision450
The dynamic efficiency implications of the regulatory framework that were discussed in Section451
1, that is, the incentives for investment in R&D, can be assessed by considering whether or not the452
HTP chooses to invest in the Phase III trial at the start of Stage 0. Having derived the condition453
for the optimal sample size, the condition for the optimal investment decision is straightforward.454
The project will be started if and only if Γ∗0( · ) > 0.455
Since Γ∗0(N = 0; ·) < 0 and given Eq. (15(i)), this allows us to define the minimum size456
of a population to treat, such that the expected profit of investing in the development of a new457
treatment is non-negative:458
Nmin = min {N ‖Γ∗0(N, ·) ≥ 0 } . (17)
This equation defines a ‘marginal project’ from the perspective of the market size for the drug459
and is required for some of the analysis of the incentives to invest in trials for rare diseases that460
is presented in Section 5.461
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5 Application462
The main theoretical results of Section 4 can be summarised as follows:463
• Assuming Stage 1 is reached, which occurs if the RA approves the new drug, both optimal464
price and optimal expected profit are at first decreasing, and then increasing, in the degree465
of uncertainty surrounding the HCI’s maximum WTP for one unit of effectiveness. The466
minimum point of the HTP’s optimal price function lies to the left of the minimum point467
of the Stage 1 optimal expected profit function.468
• In Stage 0, both optimal sample size and expected profit over the two stages are first de-469
creasing, and then increasing, in the degree of uncertainty surrounding the HCI’s maximum470
WTP.471
The economic intuition for these results has been stated in the paragraphs immediately fol-472
lowing Proposition 2. In this section, we provide a calibrated application of the theoretical model,473
which we believe is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it illustrates the U-shaped na-474
ture of the optimal price, profit and sample size functions that were described in Propositions475
1–3. Secondly, it permits us to use published data to provide tentative estimates of the quanti-476
tative impact of changes in some key parameters on optimal values. Thirdly, we generalise the477
model proposed in the theoretical analysis a little. The numerical results obtained in this section478
are valid for the specific setting under consideration and cannot be easily extended to different479
applications. However, the quantitative nature of the numerical results is consistent with the the-480
oretical findings of Section 4. Those wishing to apply the framework in their own settings are481
referred to the code that is released as part of the Online Supplementary Material.482
For the model to be operationalised, a functional form for FW , the CDF of the HCI’s maxi-483
mum WTP, must be specified. We use the logistic distribution, which satisfies all of the assump-484
tions of Section 3.4 and the sufficient condition of Proposition 2. Moreover, it has been used485
for a recent empirical analysis of how estimates of cost-effectiveness and other variables affect486
NICE decisions (Dakin et al., 2014), which we refer to in deriving the values of the location and487
scale parameters.488
Throughout Sections 3 and 4, we assumed that there was no cost to produce or commercialise489
the drug if it were to be approved for reimbursement by the HCI. This allowed us to simplify the490
proofs of some of the results, in particular concerning the choice of the optimal sample size in491
Stage 0. In order to enrichen the contribution of our application, we relax this assumption by492
introducing a parameter representing the production cost per patient treated, cp(N) ≡ I1/N + b,493
where I1 ≥ 0 is a fixed investment cost and b ≥ 0 is a constant marginal cost of production. With494
this assumption, the Stage 1 expected profit function (Eq. (3)) may be written as495
Γ1( p; θ˜ ) = N( p− cp(N) ) [ 1− FW ( p / x ;m, s ) ] , (18)
where θ˜ ≡ (N, x, m, s, I1, b ). For the parameter values which we choose for the simulation,496
the qualitative nature of our main results agree with the theoretical results. In particular, we ob-497
serve a U-shaped optimal Stage 1 profit and optimal price function, provided that m > cp(N)/x498
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(this is a reasonable condition, since it simply requires that the price that the HTP would choose499
if HCI’s maximum willingness to pay for one effectiveness unit is m for sure, exceeds cp(N)).2500
We study the recent NICE health technology appraisal of mannitol dry powder (Bronchitol)501
for inhalation for treating cystic fibrosis (NICE, 2012b), which is deemed to be a rare disease502
according to the Orphanet register of rare diseases, with a prevalence of approximately 12.6 per503
100,000 in Europe (Orphanet, 2014).504
The technology is chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, the status of cystic fibrosis as505
a rare disease means that the R&D decision could potentially be considered to be a ‘marginal506
project’, that is, one with a market size N that is close to the minimum population size required507
for investment to be deemed profitable, Nmin (refer to Eq. (17)). Secondly, high quality data508
on the clinical effectiveness, costs and QALYs upon which NICE made its recommendations509
are available in the NICE report itself and the publications reporting the results of the two key510
Phase III clinical trials (Bilton et al. (2011) and Aitken et al. (2013)). Thirdly, the control was511
effectively placebo in both clinical trials, that is, it was the same drug set at a very low, non-512
therapeutic, dosage. Finally, although the EMA and NICE approved the product for use in 2012513
for a sub-group of cystic fibrosis patients (described below), the U.S. FDA denied marketing514
authorisation in 2013, based on the same clinical trial results, citing concerns over the high level515
of discontinuation with treatment in the clinical trials and the failure to achieve effects that were516
statistically significant.517
Although the trials reported by and overlapped in calendar time, we assume a hypothetical518
scenario in which the first trial (Bilton et al., 2011) reported before the second (Aitken et al.,519
2013). This permits us to use results from the first trial to assign values to the parameters of the520
model, including the prior mean, µ0, and variance, σ20 for expected incremental effectiveness. We521
take the perspective of a HTP using information from the first trial to decide whether or not to go522
ahead with the second trial. Full details on the calculations that are used to inform the parameter523
values are contained in Appendix B.524
Table 1 summarises the main parameter values, together with their sources. It should be525
noted that the application is illustrative and is not intended to be a comment on the efficacy or526
cost-effectiveness of the technology in question.527
5.1 The role of uncertainty528
Figure 4(a) shows the U-shaped nature of the optimal ICER (price) and expected Stage 1 profit as529
functions of the uncertainty parameter, s, and the three regions representing ‘low’, ‘intermediate’530
and ‘high’ uncertainty, within which the responses of price and profits to increases in s differ:531
• The ‘low uncertainty’ range is defined as the region to the left of the minimum point on532
2When introducing fixed and variable production costs, the optimal price is no longer independent of N but
decreasing in it. The derivation of sˆ from Proposition 1, needs to be adjusted as follows: sˆ = (m− cp(N)/x)rT (0).
Moreover, the simple result describing the position of sˆ relative to s˜ following Proposition 2 no longer holds, and the
optimal ICER is no longer independent of x. This, in turn, implies that optimal Stage 1 profit is no longer linear in
x, which complicates the theoretical analysis of the optimal Stage 0 policy. Nevertheless, given the parameter values
that we choose, the U-shaped behaviour of Γ∗0 and n∗ with respect to s that was derived for the case cp(N) = 0 is
still observed.
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Parameter Definition Source Value
1. µ0 Expected value of prior beliefs concerning µ Bilton et al. (2011) 85.0mL
2. σ0 Standard deviation of prior beliefs concerning µ Bilton et al. (2011) 16.1mL
3. I0 Fixed cost of carrying out clinical trial Assumption £10,000,000
4. d Marginal cost of one pairwise allocation Assumption £50,000
5. p Estimated cost of one year’s course of mannitol for patient
who responds, and adheres to, treatment
NICE (2012a) £6,041
6. Estimated cost of placebo NICE (2012b) £0
7a. ICER Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (using rhDNase) NICE (2012b) £47,095/QALY
7b. ICER Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (not using rhDNase) NICE (2012b) £41,074/QALY
7c. ICER Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (not using rhDNase,
rapidly declining lung function)
NICE (2012b)∗ £29,999/QALY∗
8. m Location parameter of logistic distribution Dakin et al. (2014) £39,417/QALY
9. s Scale parameter of logistic distribution Dakin et al. (2014) £11,230/QALY
10. σ Population standard deviation of incremental effectiveness Bilton et al. (2011) 190.5mL
11. Fixed annual prevalence of patients to be treated NICE (2012a) 10,000
12. Market exclusivity horizon EU legislation 10 years
13. N Size of the population to treat with the new technology 11. and 12. 100,000
14. I1 Fixed cost of production Assumption £10,000,000
15. b Marginal cost of production Assumption £0
16. zα Critical value for RA threshold NICE (2012b) 1.96
Table 1: Parameter values and sources used for the application.
NOTES: ∗Reported as being under £30,000 per QALY
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(a) Optimal ICER and optimal expected Stage 1 profit as functions of
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(b) Optimal sample size and optimal expected Stage 0 profit as func-
tions of the uncertainty parameter, s. Optimal values are computed nu-
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Figure 4: Optimal Stage 1 ICER and profit and optimal Stage 0 sample size and profit as functions of the uncertainty parameter, s.
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the optimal ICER function, s˜= £6,604/QALY. As s −→ 0, the optimal ICER tends to533
the expected value of maximum WTP for one effectiveness unit (m = £39,417/QALY).534
In this region, both optimal price and optimal expected Stage 1 profits are decreasing in535
uncertainty s.536
• The ‘high uncertainty’ range is defined as the region to the right of sˆ = £19,382/QALY,537
the value of the uncertainty parameter which minimises Γ∗1 and which sets the optimal538
value of the ICER equal to the expected value of maximum WTP, m, of the HCI (see539
Proposition 1). In this region, both optimal price and optimal expected Stage 1 profit are540
increasing in uncertainty s.541
• The ‘intermediate uncertainty’ range is defined as the region lying between s˜ and sˆ. In this542
region, optimal price is increasing in s and optimal expected Stage 1 profit is decreasing in543
s.544
Figure 4(b) shows how these non-monotonic Stage 1 responses feed-back to the determina-545
tion of optimal sample size, n∗, at Stage 0. Both n∗ and Γ∗0 are first decreasing, then increasing546
in s, with the minimum of the two functions occurring at sˆ.547
Although a full welfare analysis is beyond the scope of the present work, the results obtained548
so far provide some interesting insights. For example, the value of s calibrated using results from549
the analysis of NICE’s decision by Dakin et al. (2014) (£11,230 per QALY) lies between the two550
threshold values previously reported (£6,604 and £19,382 per QALY). Hence for the specific551
case under consideration, a reduction of s to any value between these two values would have the552
following implications: a lower price (Figure 4(a)), a stronger incentive to invest in R&D via553
expected Stage 0 profits (Figure 4(b)) and more precision on the estimate of the effectiveness via554
n∗ (Figure 4(b)).555
Another interesting question is whether, and to what extent, a lack of transparency on the556
true cost-effectiveness threshold (s > 0) can shift rents from the HTP to the HCI. In the formal557
limit case of s = 0 per QALY, if mx > cp(N), the HTP’s optimal price in Stage 1 is p∗ = mx.558
With the parameter values of our application, and assuming that m is equal to the true value559
of the HCI’s maximum WTP, the optimal sample size for this special case is n∗ = 135, and560
the corresponding optimal profit Γ∗0 = £575,000,000. In comparison, for the situation where s561
equals the value calibrated from NICE’s actual decisions (s = £11,230 per QALY), n∗ = 117562
and Γ∗0 =£299,000,000. An interesting extension would be to estimate the Expected Value of563
Perfect Information about the cost-effectiveness threshold.564
5.2 The role of market size565
The results of Section 4 showed that the optimal price setting policy is independent of the size566
of the population to treat when cp(N) = 0 because the optimal profit per patient would be567
independent of N . Figure 5(a) shows that this is no longer the case when costs cp(N) > 0 are568
accounted for in Stage 1. In particular, the optimal price is decreasing in the population size,569
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Figure 5: Expected profits at the per patient level as a function of price/sample size for various
sizes of the market.
meaning that, for a comparatively rare disease, it is optimal to propose a higher price. This, in570
turn, leads to a lower probability of acceptance and lower expected profits per patient.3571
Fixing s at £11,230/QALY, Figure 5(b) shows the expected profit per patient at Stage 0 for572
different values of the market size as a function of sample size.4 The figure shows that the optimal573
sample size increases with the size of the population. In increasing order (that is, as N increases574
in Figure 5(b)), the optimal sample sizes for the Stage 0 decision are n∗ = 0, 53, 73, 117 and575
168, respectively. The probability of RA acceptance under the prior, is also strictly increasing576
in N and may be computed for each specific optimal sample size. Performing this calculation577
yields values of probability of adoption equal to 0, 0.864, 0.934, 0.983 and 0.995, respectively.578
From the policy perspective, the main concern about orphan diseases is the lack of incentives579
for the firm to undertake R&D projects that could benefit those patients. In Section 4.2.2 we580
defined Nmin as the minimum market size such that the HTP would find it profitable to start the581
project. Figure 5(b) shows that, for the set of parameters used in the calibration, Nmin is between582
5,000 and 10,000.583
The analysis presented so far shows that some of the parameters relevant in Stage 1 and which584
might be, to some extent, under the control of the HCI may be crucial in providing incentives585
to invest in R&D. We conclude the discussion of our application with an attempt to investigate586
quantitatively the role of two parameters characterising Stage 0: α and nmin. Figure 6 shows Nmin587
3The economic intuition for the effect of N on p∗ is straightforward. Consider two drugs with very different
population sizes, but common fixed costs of production I1 > 0. For both drugs, an increase in p increases expected
revenues if the technology is eventually adopted, but also reduces the probability of adoption. Absent fixed invest-
ment costs, both terms would be proportional to N and the marginal condition would not be affected. But with
I1 > 0, what is left to the firm producing the drug for a less common disease is less. Therefore, the marginal cost
due to the reduction in the probability of adoption is less. This leads to a higher value of the optimal price.
4Figure 5(b) shows profits per patient, and not total profits, for the sake of clarity. Note that the maximisation
problem is unaffected.
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Figure 6: Minimum patient population to benefit (Nmin) as a function of RA’s minimum sample
size (nmin) for different values of α.
as a function of nmin for some different values of α, with 5 ≤ nmin ≤ 80. As expected, for a given588
value of nmin, Nmin decreases in the significance level, α, because a stricter policy by the RA (a589
lower α) requires, other things being equal, larger samples, which pay less in terms of expected590
profit when the population to treat is small (refer to the per study-subject reward that appeared591
in the first order necessary condition for the optimal choice of the sample size in Eq. (12)). For a592
given value of α, Nmin is non-decreasing in nmin because, when the latter is a binding constraint,593
an increase means that a larger market is required to make non-negative profits. The flat parts of594
the curves correspond to regions where n∗ > nmin. Overall, the figure suggests that any policy595
consideration on the impact of statistical requirements on the incentive to invest in R&D should596
take both of these parameters into account. In quantitative terms, for the set of parameters used,597
the impact of increasing α from 2.5% to 20% is to almost halve the value of Nmin when nmin is598
very small.599
6 Discussion and conclusions600
Historically, economic considerations have played a secondary role to the demonstration of safety601
and efficacy in the drug-approval process. However, the increasing need for regulators to assess602
the economic implications of their decisions implies that integration between economic and clin-603
ical considerations is much greater nowadays. To the best of our knowledge, the two-stage model604
that we propose is the first to present a full analysis of how regulation of access to the market605
interacts with the reimbursement decision of a health care insurer, and how exogenous incentives606
within the regulatory framework either encourage, or discourage, investment in R&D for new607
pharmaceutical products.608
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Our main results relate to how the degree of uncertainty surrounding the true value of the609
health care insurer’s maximum willingness to pay for one unit of effectiveness impacts optimal610
profit, price and sample size. In particular, it is shown that, for reasonable functional forms611
describing the uncertainty surrounding the true value of the insurer’s willingness to pay, optimal612
profit, price and sample size are U-shaped functions of the uncertainty parameter. This allows us613
to identify three regions – ‘low uncertainty’, ‘intermediate uncertainty’ and ‘high uncertainty’ –614
within which changes in the uncertainty parameter have different qualitative effects. Although615
a full welfare analysis is beyond the scope of our paper and we cannot characterize the optimal616
degree of uncertainty either from the societal or the HCI’s perspective, the regions provide clear617
insights on who gains and who loses from changes in the degree of uncertainty. In the ‘low618
uncertainty’ region, an increase in uncertainty leads to lower prices, lower expected profits, and619
smaller sample size. Overall, the policy implication is that, in the ‘low uncertainty’ region,620
an increase in uncertainty benefits the insurer via a reduced impact of the new product on the621
budget, but it also reduces expected returns for the industry and hence incentives to invest in622
R&D. Even if development is undertaken, sample sizes of Phase III trials will be smaller. In623
contrast, in the ‘high uncertainty’ region, the impact of an increase in uncertainty leads to a624
higher price, higher expected profit, a larger impact on health budgets, and a larger sample size.625
A particularly interesting case is that of ‘intermediate uncertainty’: in this region, by reducing626
uncertainty, insurers would be better off due to the lower prices and the more precise estimate627
of effectiveness provided by trials with larger samples; the industry would benefit from larger628
expected profits; this in turn will benefit patients, especially those with diseases in areas that are629
of limited interest for the industry, such as orphan diseases, by making the decision to invest in630
R&D more likely. This final case is of particular interest given the results of the application,631
which show that the calibrated value for the uncertainty parameter lies within the intermediate632
region.633
A question that naturally follows from this result is how, in practice, an insurer could change634
the degree of uncertainty around its maximum WTP for one unit of effectiveness. While many635
insurers include cost-effectiveness among criteria on which their adoption decisions are based,636
few of them explicitly state a specific threshold or a range for the maximum value of the ICER.637
Those that already refer to a specific range could reduce uncertainty by either narrowing the638
range, or by defining, and making public, rules that affect the adoption decision within that639
range. For example, a price premium could be explicitly defined as a function of the size of the640
population to treat, if favouring orphan drugs is an objective, or it could be stated that the upper641
limit of a range is the relevant cost-effectiveness threshold for drugs targeted to life-threatening642
conditions.643
Concerning incentives that can be provided at the development stage, it has been suggested644
that this opportunity for regulators might have been under-explored so far (Clarke et al., 2014).645
Our model provides a framework to investigate this and, in principle, to study the substitutability646
of incentives at the commercialisation and the development stage. Our application includes a647
tentative estimate of the impact of a change in the significance level (α) of the statistical test, used648
by the RA to approve a new drug, on the minimum size of the market that ensures non negative649
expected profit from an investment in R&D. There is a strong convention within RAs that the650
type I error rate should be controlled at 5% 2-sided, that is, that the one-sided level, α, should651
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be 0.025. However, the FDA has stressed that this rule is not written in stone and actual FDA652
decisions for rare diseases confirm this (Sasinowski, 2012). Our results on the consequences of653
different choices of α are therefore practically relevant.654
We conclude with a discussion of a number of limitations of the model and opportunities for655
future research. It is assumed that there is only one authority which controls access to the market656
– the RA – and one which decides on reimbursement – the HCI. Although key decisions tend to657
be concentrated in a limited number of RAs in the real world (e.g. the FDA in the US and the658
EMA in Europe), this is not the case for insurers. In addition, it is assumed that the regulatory659
hurdles are set exogenously, and we study the optimal behaviour of the HCI in the presence660
of these hurdles. A natural next step would be to consider the regulatory process itself as an661
optimisation problem, and to model the optimal behaviour of both HCI and regulatory agencies.662
Regarding reimbursement decisions, our model is based on a ‘cost per unit of effectiveness’663
criterion. However, not all insurers use such an approach. For example, multiple HCIs are active664
in the US, and US legislation bans the formal use of cost per QALY for insurance decisions.665
Both the concept of quality-adjustment of life, and of setting a price on the value of a life (year)666
are far from uncontroversial. Our model could potentially be extended to allow the sponsor gain667
to be dependent on decisions from a multitude of RAs and HCIs. Moreover, decisions made668
in different countries may not be independent, such as when reference pricing mechanisms are669
adopted. Taking this into account would raise a number of interesting and challenging questions670
related to strategic interactions and a provider’s optimal sequence of reimbursement decisions.671
Another valuable extension would be the formal modelling of price negotiations at Stage 1.672
One could also relax the assumption that the incremental cost of the new technology only673
depends on the difference between prices. A better technology may, for example, also reduce674
other health care costs, which would introduce dependency between incremental cost and effec-675
tiveness. Methods similar to those used by Kikuchi and Gittins (2009) and Kikuchi et al. (2008)676
(see Section 2) could be used to model such a relationship.677
Although exogenous in our model, the HTP’s beliefs about the HCI’s maximum WTP could678
be modelled as endogenous, so that the HTP learns about the true value of the maximum WTP679
by observing the HCI’s decisions and updating beliefs.680
Although it is acknowledged that the drug discovery and development process extends well681
beyond the remit of this paper (Pennings and Sereno, 2011), the part of the process that we682
consider is crucial because of the size of its costs, which are estimated to be around 50% of683
the total cost of clinical development (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,684
2014), and the high probability of failure (estimated to be around 50% in Phase III). Neverthe-685
less, the recursive nature of the solution to the model could permit earlier stages in the drug686
development process to be added.687
Finally, our model has assumed that the RA and HCI refer to a common measure of effec-688
tiveness for a single condition. Things get more complicated when RAs and HCIs focus on689
distinctly different variables: RAs often prefer an objective, ‘hard’, endpoint, while HCIs may690
look more at patient-reported quality-of-life. Recently, the EMA has invited HCIs to increase691
the alignment. In an extension, we could therefore assume the existence of two different, but692
correlated, response variables, one for each stage of the model. An interesting question would693
be the degree to which a lack of alignment between RA and HCI objectives could disincentivise694
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drug development. A further extension could consider use of the product for multiple conditions.695
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703
A Proofs704
A.1 Stage 1705
Proofs of comparative static results (Eqs. (9a) and (9b)):706
• Results for Γ∗1: Since v∗(m, s) > 0 and 0 < FW < 1, that ∂Γ
∗
1
∂N
and ∂Γ
∗
1
∂x
are positive is707
immediate from Eq. (8b). By the Envelope Theorem,708
∂Γ∗1
∂m
=
∂Γ1
∂m
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗
= Np∗
(
1
s
)
fT
(
p∗/x−m
s
)
> 0.
• Results for p∗: Partial differentiation of Eq. (8a) immediately gives ∂p∗
∂N
= 0 and ∂p∗
∂x
=709
v∗(m, s) > 0. Since v∗ satisfies the first order condition, differentiation of Eq. (7) gives710
∂v∗
∂m
rW (v
∗ ;m, s ) + v∗
(
∂rW
∂v
(v∗ ;m, s )
∂v∗
∂m
+
∂rW
∂m
(v∗ ;m, s )
)
= 0 ⇐⇒
∂v∗
∂m
= − v
∗ ∂rW
∂m
(v∗ ;m, s )
rW (v∗ ;m, s ) + v∗
∂rW
∂v
(v∗ ;m, s )
.
By Assumption A2, ∂rW
∂v
≥ 0. Since v∗ > 0 and rW > 0 always hold, the denominator of711
the fraction above is positive and the sign of ∂v∗
∂m
equals the sign of −∂rW
∂m
. But ∂rW
∂m
≤ 0,712
so that ∂v∗
∂m
≥ 0 and ∂p∗
∂m
≥ 0.713
714
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Proof of Proposition 1:715
Let g(v ;m, s ) = vrW (v ;m, s ). Assumption A2 can be used to show that g is strictly increas-716
ing in v:717
∂g(v ;m, s )
∂v
= rW (·) + v ∂rW (·)
∂v
> 0. (19)
Note that the hazard function for W is rW (w) = rT
(
w−m
s
)
/s.5 As can be seen by rearranging718
Eq. (6), g(v∗(m, s ) ;m, s ) = 1. Combining this result with Eq. (19) implies that, for any v,719
v ⋚ v∗(m, s ) if and only if g(v ;m, s ) ⋚ 1. In particular, for v = m,720
m ⋚ v∗(m, s ) ⇐⇒ mrW (m ;m, s ) ⋚ 1 ⇐⇒ mrT (0)/s ⋚ 1 ⇐⇒ mrT (0) ⋚ s.
Hence, for any fixed m > 0, there exists a value of the scale parameter, sˆ = mrT (0), such that721
the optimal ICER, v∗(·), is greater than m if and only if s > sˆ. This observation may be used722
to characterise the response of Γ∗1 to changes in s. For, by the Envelope Theorem applied to Eq.723
(8b) and the rotation result for FW in Eq. (4) (and shown in Figure 1):724
∂Γ∗1
∂s
=
∂Γ1
∂s
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗
= −Nxv∗ ∂FW
∂s
(v∗;m, s ) R 0 ⇐⇒ v∗ R m ⇐⇒ s R sˆ.
725
Proof of Proposition 2:726
By making use of the substitution v = m + st, we see that solving the first order necessary727
condition in Eq. (7) for v > 0 is equivalent to solving the following transformed problem for728
t > −m/s,729
(m+ st)rT (t)/s = 1 ⇐⇒ −m/s = t− 1/rT (t) ⇐⇒ ψ(t) = −m/s,
where ψ(t) ≡ t − 1/rT (t). By Assumption A2, ψ(t) is strictly increasing. This implies that730
its inverse ψ−1 is well-defined and that the solution to the equation above may be written as731
t∗ = ψ−1(−m/s). The corresponding solution for the original problem is then v∗ = m +732
sψ−1(−m/s). Fixing m, differentiation with respect to s yields733
∂v∗
∂s
(s) = ψ−1(−m/s) + m/s
ψ′ (ψ−1(−m/s)) .
Now, since the change of variable θ = ψ−1(−m/s) ⇐⇒ ψ(θ) = −m/s defines a strictly734
increasing mapping of s ∈ (0,∞) on to θ ∈ (−∞, ψ−1(0)), ∂v∗
∂s
(s) is strictly increasing if and735
only if θ 7→ θ− ψ(θ)
ψ′(θ)
is strictly increasing. Differentiation with respect to θ results in the sufficient736
condition737
1− ψ
′(θ)2 − ψ(θ)ψ′′(θ)
ψ′(θ)2
> 0 ⇐⇒ ψ(θ)ψ′′(θ) > 0.
5The probability density function of W may be written as fW (w) = F ′T (w−ms ) = fT
(
w−m
s
)
/s. The hazard
function for W is therefore: rW (w) = [fT
(
w−m
s
)
/s] /
[
1− FT
(
w−m
s
)]
= rT
(
w−m
s
)
/s.
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Since ψ(θ) = ψ(ψ−1(−m/s)) = −m/s < 0 when m > 0, we obtain the sufficient condition738
ψ′′(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ (−∞, ψ−1(0)). Because M(θ) = θ − ψ(θ), this is equivalent to M ′′(θ) > 0.739
This concludes the proof thatM ′′ > 0 implies that ∂v∗
∂s
(s) is strictly increasing. By combining740
this result with the result from Proposition 1 thatm ⋚ v∗(m, s) ⇐⇒ sˆ ⋚ s, it is straightforward741
to show that lims→0 v∗(m, s) = m. This in turn implies that, as s increases, v∗ is first strictly742
decreasing and then strictly increasing, attaining a minimum value at some s˜ which must satisfy743
0 < s˜ < sˆ.744
745
Position of s˜ relative to sˆ:746
Proposition 1 defines sˆ = mrT (0). There is no closed form solution for the value of s˜. However,747
from the proof of Proposition 2, it may be shown that s˜/m = 1/|ψ(θ˜)|, where ψ(t) = t−1/rT (t)748
and θ˜ = argmaxθ<0|θ|rT (θ). As a result, the ratio sˆ/s˜ may be written as rT (0)|ψ(θ˜)| and is749
entirely determined by the choice of the standardised distribution for the uncertainty concerning750
the HTP’s maximum WTP. Numerical computations show that sˆ/s˜ = 2.935 for the standard751
logistic distribution and sˆ/s˜ = 2.946 for the standard normal distribution.752
A.2 Stage 0753
Proof of Proposition 3:754
Let ζ(n) = E
[
X |X > xcrit(n)
]
P(X > xcrit(n) ), so that Γ0 = N ρ∗(m, s )ζ(n)− (I0 + dn).755
By the Envelope Theorem,756
∂Γ∗0
∂s
=
∂Γ0
∂s
∣∣∣∣
n=n∗
= ζ(n∗)N
∂ρ∗(m, s )
∂s
. (20)
Since ζ(n∗) is always positive and the sign of ∂ρ∗/∂s equals the sign of ∂Γ∗1/∂s (for any fixed,757
but arbitrary, x), part (a) follows from Proposition 1.758
By the implicit function theorem,759
∂n∗
∂s
= −
(
∂2Γ0
∂n2
)−1
∂2Γ0
∂s∂n
∣∣∣∣
n=n∗
. (21)
By assumption, ∂2Γ0/∂n2
∣∣∣∣
n=n∗
< 0, and hence the sign of ∂n∗/∂s equals the sign of760
∂2Γ0
∂s∂n
∣∣∣∣
n=n∗
=
∂2
∂s∂n
(Nρ∗ζ − (I0 + dn))
∣∣∣∣
n=n∗
= N
∂ρ∗(m, s)
∂s
∂ζ(n∗)
∂n
. (22)
By definition, n∗ solves the first order necessary condition, implying761
∂ζ(n∗)/∂n = d/(Nρ∗(m, s)) > 0. Therefore, the sign of ∂n∗/∂s equals the sign of ∂ρ∗/∂s,762
and part (b) follows from Proposition 1.763
764
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B Sources of parameter values for application765
We briefly summarise the results of the two clinical studies considered (Bilton et al. (2011);766
Aitken et al. (2013)) and the NICE health technology appraisal as it relates to the estimates of767
cost-effectiveness.768
• The Phase III trials. Bilton et al. (2011) compared 400 mg of mannitol twice daily with769
placebo for 324 subjects aged 6 years or over, randomised 3:2 to mannitol and control. The770
subjects were based in Europe, Australia and New Zealand. At 26 weeks, upon conclusion771
of the double-blind stage of the study, the authors reported a significant improvement in772
forced expiratory volume in one second (FEV1) in subjects receiving mannitol compared773
with control. Aitken et al. (2013) compared the same dosage of mannitol to placebo for774
192 patients aged 6 years or over, again randomised 3:2. Patients were recruited from775
North America, South America and Europe. The authors reported a statistically significant776
improvement in FEV1 for the mannitol group compared with control during the double-777
blind stage of the study (the first 26 weeks). Both studies included open label periods,778
running for 26 weeks after the double-blind stage had concluded, intended to collect more779
data on adverse reactions. The studies also collected data on quality of life, together with780
other secondary outcome measures.781
• The NICE Health Technology Appraisal’s assessment of cost-effectiveness. Cost-782
effectiveness was assessed in the manufacturer’s submission to NICE using a Markov783
model comparing treatment with and without mannitol and populated with data from the784
clinical trials (NICE, 2012a). The NICE technology appraisal calculates ICERs according785
to subgroups defined according to whether or not patients were using an alternative treat-786
ment, rhDNase. The results for the estimated ICER are split by this classification: that787
for mannitol compared to treatment without mannitol in the rhDNase group is £47,095788
per QALY and that for the group not using rhDNase is £41,074. The report summarises789
the results of various sensitivity analyses which resulted in changes in these estimates790
and concluded that the high reported ICERs (between £50,000 and £80,000 per QALY)791
for patients taking rhDNase meant that the treatment could not be recommended for them792
because it was not cost-effective; the ICER for those not on rhDNase because they were in-793
eligible, intolerant, or because of inadequate response was considered to be above £30,000794
per QALY. However, for those in the latter group whose lung function was decreasing795
rapidly, the ICER was considered to be under £30,000 per QALY (two reported estimates796
are £27,700 and £30,100 per QALY). The NICE appraisal committee therefore concluded797
that mannitol could be considered a cost-effective use of NHS resources for this sub-group798
only.799
Bilton et al. (2011) report a statistically significant improvement in FEV1 compared with800
placebo (p < 0.001) in the first trial. Averaged across the post-randomisation visits, the point801
estimate of x is reported to be 85.03mL with a 95% confidence interval of (53.5mL,116.6mL)802
(Bilton et al., 2011, page 1073, section entitled ‘Efficacy’). It is therefore assumed that µ0 =803
85.03mL for the start of the second Phase III trial (Aitken et al., 2013).804
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The 95% confidence interval reported by Bilton et al. is used to obtain an estimate of σ, the805
standard deviation of the difference between effects in the treatment and control arms. Assume806
that the standard deviations in the two trial arms are equal, with a common value, σ/
√
2. Then,807
referencing Table 1 of Bilton et al. (2011), the sample sizes of nt = 177 (number of subjects in808
treatment arm) and nc = 118 (number of subjects in control arm), an estimate of σ/
√
2 may be809
obtained by rearranging the standard error formula for two independent means when the variance810
is known:811
σˆ/
√
2 = SE(X)
(√
1/nt + 1/nc
)−1
, (23)
where SE(X) = (116.6 − 85.03)/1.96 = 16.10, obtained from the 95% confidence interval.812
Solving Eq. (23) yields σˆ = √2 ∗ 135.5 = 191.63. Alternatively, we may assume a sample813
size equivalent to approximately n = 140 pairwise allocations and estimate σ directly as σˆ =814
SE(X)
√
n = 16.10×√140 = 190.5. The standard deviation for the prior is simply taken to be815
the standard error, σ0 = SE(X) = 16.10.816
The calibration of the values for m and s of the logistic function merit some discussion.817
The values in units of £/QALY are taken from Dakin et al. (2014), who estimate a number of818
different regression models for past NICE appraisal decisions and find that the reported ICER819
was the major factor influencing the probability of acceptance (no other factor, other than the820
type of condition, was found to have a statistically significant effect on NICE’s decision). For821
the model with the highest prediction accuracy, Dakin et al. (2014) report that the ICER values822
corresponding to probabilities of NICE recommendations of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 were £51,754,823
£39,417 and £27,047 per QALY, respectively (Table III, model 4 in Dakin et al. (2014)). The824
pairs (0.5, 39,417) and (0.75, 51,754), when inserted into the logistic function, give two equations825
for m and s which can be solved to yield the following estimates: m = £39,417/QALY and826
s = £11,230/QALY. Now, the unit of the incremental efficacy x is not measured in QALYs,827
but as FEV1 mL. Hence, when performing computations within the model, it is first necessary828
to convert incremental efficacy into the corresponding number of QALYs. Calibration gives a829
conversion factor of 0.0018 QALY/mL.830
We assume 10,000 patients treated per year, and a time horizon of 10 years, which is the831
length of the exclusivity period allowed in the European Union for rare diseases. This implies832
N = 100,000.833
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